Security, Identity, and Trust in Multi-Vendor Agent Networks
When agents from different vendors, departments, or organizations negotiate tasks, the security model cannot rely on perimeter defenses. The perimeter vanished the moment the first agent called a peer outside its own process boundary. A2A v1.0 addresses this with a capability-based security model built on four controls.
Identity verification through Signed Agent Cards ensures that every participant in a task can be cryptographically identified. This is the foundation: if you do not know who the other agent is, you cannot decide whether to trust it.
Task-level authorization ensures that even after identity is established, the receiving agent evaluates whether the requester is authorized for the specific task being requested. An agent may be willing to share public pricing with anyone but unwilling to share cost structures without a signed NDA recorded in its authorization policy.
Artifact scoping controls what data is attached to a task and who can access it. A2A tasks carry artifacts — documents, data extracts, calculation results — and the protocol defines how these artifacts are encrypted, how access is delegated, and how expiration is enforced. This prevents the casual data leakage that happens when agents exchange more context than necessary.
Auditability through structured task logs ensures that every negotiation, every status update, and every result transfer is recorded in a format that compliance systems can ingest. For enterprises subject to SOC 2, GDPR, or industry-specific regulations, this audit trail is not optional. It is the evidence that autonomous systems are operating within defined boundaries.
The principle is the same one we advocate for all agent governance: begin with almost no ambient authority and grant permissions explicitly, task by task, artifact by artifact. A2A's design embodies this principle at the protocol level.